Rahul Bhonsle, Indian commander with over 30 years of military experience, analyzed exclusively for Q Magazine, the impact of intelligence activity in negotiations with terrorist groups in the post-Al Qaeda age of terrorism.
Europe under the siege of terror
Emergence of the Islamic State variously known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or Levant (ISIS/ISIL) has posed new challenges. The ISIS despite unprecedented brutality shown on the battlefields of Iraq and Syria has been able to attract large number of youth across diverse nation-states from Europe to South and South East Asia to join the agenda of terror.
Using the World Wide Web to great effect, ISIS has been able to radicalize the youth to carry out acts of terror outside their geographic sphere of influence in West Asia.
Recent attacks in France, Belgium, and Denmark are a testimony to loosely radicalized groups or individuals carrying out attacks in urban areas which have had no history of terrorism in the recent past.
The tactics include hostage taking, siege and armed assaults classics of the “Bakunin,” era.
These are soft replication of reprehensible and brutal killings by the ISIS of Western and non-Western hostages in Iraq and Syria over the past few months.
To the people and governments in Europe, terrorism has hit closer home and poses a new dilemma. With some youth having joined the ISIS and more influenced by the ideology of violence, incidents of hostage taking and armed assaults including suicide terrorism are likely to increase.
Negotiating with citizens who are wielding the weapon of terror is a harsh reality that democratic governments in Europe will have to face in the months ahead.
In the larger context is the need to negotiate with a terrorist group to mainstream it thereby strategically defeating terror. The need of the hour is preparing for both streams of engagement with terrorist groups – strategic engagement and tactical for countering a hostage situation.
Reviewing the policies of negotiating with terrorist groups, vital in order to combat terrorism
Most nation states have a policy of negotiating with radicals. This varies from a strictly having no truck with terrorist groups to openness for talks or a case by case approach.
In the light of the new developments with brutal tactics used by the “new,” terrorists inspired by the ISIS, a negotiation policy is necessary.
In case the government has the executive powers to do so, the same must be addressed on priority or taken up by the Parliament which should draft guidelines for this purpose.
This should be done given responsibility of the state to defeat terrorism in the larger context as also secure lives of its citizens. Emphasizing on the human aspect and weakening the ideological obduracy of terror groups will prevent a state being criticized for negotiating with the “devil”. At the same time it should be remembered that an overly soft policy will encourage hostage taking.
Taking the case of talks with terrorist groups to bring them around to join the political process first, where a government has decided that it will engage with terrorist groups, a carefully crafted strategy for engagement should be evolved. This should ensure that the State does not compromise on its sovereignty and also operates within international laws. This task is assigned to top security managers at the national level – police or military as the case may be.
Terrorist groups will be willing to change their ideological position and change their strategy from violent to democratic in two circumstances – when they feel that the goals are unachievable or when the top leadership has been weaned away from the original cause.
For this to happen it is important to destroy the capability of the group to carry out terrorist attacks with impunity. Only when an organization is weak will it come to the talks table.
This is more than evident in the case of the Taliban in Afghanistan where despite concerted efforts by all sides including the Afghans, the Americans and the Pakistanis, the Mullah Omar faction remains unyielding. The pull out of NATO forces from the country in 2014 has given it hope of succeeding howsoever elusive it may seem. Thus the Taliban is reluctant to sit on the talks table and even if it does in the future, the terms of negotiations are likely to be highly unfavorable to the Afghan government.

Intelligence agencies offer expertise that can save lives
Intelligence agencies have an important task in assessing the right time for conciliation with a group. If it is too early, the rebels may have an advantage and speak from a position of strength, in case delayed the advantage of bringing down the level of violence is lost.
Even where a terrorist group has decided to give up violence the process of joining the mainstream is likely to be long requiring infinite patience.
For the government, the first requirement is to identify those elements in the organization that may be more amenable to negotiations than others. These are moderates with whom contact should be established.
This is a cloak and dagger process carried out at the highest level for the consequences of failure are high while chances of success at this stage are limited. In the case, talks fail the government could be accused of compromise with terrorists contrary to democratic principles. Thus, the decision will remain a fine one, at the same time constantly working towards the objective of bringing down violence by all means is necessary.
Opening and sustaining back channels for this purpose is important. This is delicate intelligence work that is not evident to the public eye carried out by emissaries of both sides and will take months and years of patient engagement. Intermediary states and organizations including the Red Cross, Red Crescent, and others can play an important role though they would not like the same to be publicized.

The actual act of negotiations will be carried out by a select group of experts. Negotiators need to have varied capabilities. Language is the first consideration in the selection. In case interlocutors are not able to speak the same, interpreters could be used in which case there should be two sets one who are openly negotiating and another monitoring the talks to ensure that these are on the desired course.
Intelligence will be crucial at this stage. Familiarity with operations of the group, its leaders, their cultural and social characteristics and previous history of talks will be invaluable to a mediator.
Intelligence agencies will have to share dossiers with the negotiators and provide maximum information including smaller details as the wine and cigars preferred by a terror group leader to facilitate the mediating team to develop a rapport, breed familiarity and soften the other side. The intelligence team will have experts ranging from those who have intimate knowledge of the group, communication monitoring agencies, psychologists and perception managers.
At the other end of the negotiating spectrum is talks with a group that has taken hostages. Broad principles of engagement are the same as that for strategic mediation, but the most critical aspect is that these are time critical as the terrorists will work on a deadline for the government to meet their demands. Talks, in this case, are also exposed to the gaze of the public.
Thus working on thin ice given short time window and pressure of talks accentuated by the constant focus of national media, mediators will have to keep his eye on the ultimate objective release of the hostages.
Here again intelligence has a major role to play. In the case of radicalized individuals or small groups, not much information would be available. The aim should be to build rapidly on the picture from social media, internet groups and other mediums where such individuals have interacted and collect maximum information possible. This should be corroborated with physical contacts with those who may be familiar with the persons such as friends, colleagues or neighbors to be able to build a psychological profile of the malcontent.

Rahul Bhonsale for Q Magazine
Managing a hostage crisis
The first task of negotiators is establishing his credibility with the group and ensure that hostages are safe at all times. While terrorist groups are likely to pose deadlines, it should be remembered that these are not sacrosanct and mediators should be able to ensure sustained extension.
Negotiators must know that the hostages are not the ultimate objective of the terrorists but are symbolic to establish their influence by terrorizing the population and force governments to do their bidding.
Mediators must adopt a calm approach and try to evoke the personal emotional chords in the hostile. By being a good listener and allowing the rebels to vent his grievances a rapport can be established which can open varied channels of communication for achieving the ultimate purpose of the release of hostages.
In the case of a hostage situation in a public area the first step is to isolate of the location where hostages have been taken, deny movement to the hostage taker by restricting him to the confined area, evaluate information available, establish links of communication with the hostage taker and commence engagement.
The negotiator should ensure that he retains the initiative at all times. The process will be in the form of dangling carrots while obtusely denoting legal consequences of the act.
A strategy of exhaustion has to be adopted to wear down the terrorist leadership.
Moreover it must be remembered that even the most hardened terrorists will remain under stress while engaging in negotiations that should be exploited to advantage.
A sequential release of the hostage should be attempted. For instance even hardened terrorists can be persuaded to release children, women and the aged. This will prepare grounds for release of others and not necessarily endanger them.
Frequently talks will go on simultaneously with a rescue mission launched by special counter terrorism forces. Smooth coordination would be necessary while the negotiator should be careful, not to reveal the same.
At the same time, public pressure should be built on the terrorist group to release hostages. Frequently it is the government which is posed a dilemma by public opinion. Effective perception management, on the other hand, will ensure that ire of the people is directed at the terrorist group.
Success or otherwise in a hostage situation should be followed up to either engage with the terrorist leadership in talks at the broader or strategic level or build intelligence to carry out physical interception and neutralize the rebels.
The Westphalian state has to protect its citizens
The overall state policy of countering terrorism cannot be compromised whatever be the conditions under which negotiations are held. Thus, it is the responsibility of every State to neutralize such groups and follow-up action must result in their degradation and destruction. Here possible division in the group splitting hardliners with the moderates should be exploited to commence talks with the latter while continuing to target the inflexible on whom, “reality,” of non-sustainability of achieving their cause through violence may not dawn so easily.
The Westphalian state has the responsibility to protect citizens from all forms of violence, state and non-state alike. All means need to be employed for this purpose including negotiating with terrorist groups. While many states claim to have a strict policy of, not mediating, the reality is that they can hardly do without the same. A structured approach is, therefore, necessary be it for strategic engagement or in a hostage situation, some essential aspects of which have been outlined herein.

Brigadier (Retired) Rahul K Bhonsle, MSc, MPhil, MBA is an Indian army military veteran with 30 years active field experience in counter militancy and terrorism operations. He is presently Director of Sasia Security-Risks.com, a South Asian security risk and knowledge management consultancy which specializes in future scenarios, military capacity building and conflict trends in South Asia. Brig Rahul Bhonsle has worked on the entire gamut of issues related international security to include an overall assessment of non-traditional security threats to India conceptualized in, “Asymmetrical Challenges to India’s National Security [2003]”. “Securing India: Assessment of Defense and Security Capabilities,” [2009] outlines defense modernization strategies for India. His recent works relate to terrorism include, “Beyond Bin Laden: Global Terrorism Scenarios,” (2011) & “Countering Transnational Terrorism,” (2010).
















































